Executive summary

As the Russian presidential election in March 2024 approaches, it is already possible to identify the main narratives associated with the campaign of Putin and other candidates, as well as possible campaigns of the opposition, to make preliminary predictions and conclusions about what Russian politics and the accompanying propagandist and disinformation campaigns might look like after the election.

The main narratives of Putin’s election campaign were already defined in the summer of ’23, when the Kremlin, realizing its difficult position on the international stage, and seeing the growing anxiety of Russians, both because of the war, isolation and economic challenges, built all its campaigns around two main messages: «Russia is not in isolation» and «war does not exist for Russians». All events of the summer and fall of ’23 were covered by propaganda in this vein, from «friendship» with Africa, Kim Jong-un, China, Iran, and Hamas, to any war-related issues that were glossed over when propaganda deliberately diverted Russians’ attention with the Kremlin’s «successes» in the economy, international politics, and other daily events.

As the election date approaches, amidst the lack of advancement of the Ukrainian army, the decreased focus on the war by the West due to the attack on Israel, and general fatigue, we see the return of war narratives to Putin’s election campaign as well. «Everything for the Victory» is the slogan under which the war topic is actively manifested within the Kremlin’s election campaign, putting forward such symbols of invasion as the singer Shaman or the commander of the Sparta battalion and speaker of the illegal DPR parliament Artem Zhoga, whom the Kommersant publication names as possible members of Putin’s nomination initiative group or frontmen of his electoral campaign. Putin himself has also visited the headquarters of the Southern Military District several times during the month (on October 19 and November 10). These visits are certainly part of the president’s active election campaign.

The return of the war theme to the Kremlin’s election campaign is also confirmed by the activity of war correspondents, one of whom, Semyon Pegov, may become a member of the ruling United Russia party, and by the activity of the so-called All-Russian People’s Front (APRF), a public movement created in 2011 with Putin’s support on the eve of the 2012 elections. This movement is now not only preparing the launch of various formats to support the Russian president for the 2024 elections, but is also actively cooperating with war correspondents, for example, by creating a joint telegram channel «For Transparency. Russia’s War Correspondents.»

The ARPF is also actively promoting the «Everything for the Victory» narrative in its channels as one of the symbols for Putin’s re-election.

Whereas in the summer and early fall the Kremlin propaganda tried to ignore the war based on sociological surveys that showed Russians to be very anxious and war-weary, now the topic of war no longer seems chaotic or potentially dangerous for the Russian authorities. Considering the situation at the front and the geopolitical and domestic challenges the West is now facing, Moscow is clearly and confidently promoting the narrative of «victory» through various media personalities. In order to simulate nationwide support, the All-Russian People’s Front is actively promoting the «Putin’s Team» brand launched for the last 2018 elections. Now this brand has been transformed into «People’s Front. Putin’s Team.» Between constant publications on raising funds for military needs within the framework of the «Everything for Victory!» project, the People’s Front channel began to constantly feature quotes from public figures who are part of this «Team».

It is the All-Russian People’s Front and Putin’s Team that will apparently create the illusion of mass support and work in the public sphere to mobilize the electorate on the eve of the elections, urging Russians to actively unite once again around the flag and the president «who leads Russia to victory».

Sociological data, political events of the past two years, and the Kremlin’s narratives of disinformation and propaganda show that the 2024 elections will have the sole purpose of demonstrating «nationwide support» for Vladimir Putin, which will also be transformed by propaganda into support for war with both Ukraine and the Western world (narratives: «they are against us,» «we will stop them,» «we are winning,» «building a new just world»).

It is worth noting that almost 78% of Russians «gave» their votes for constitutional changes in 2020. The Kremlin governors in the September 2023 elections also «received» an average of about 78% of the vote each. Putin’s spokesman Peskov bluntly stated after the September elections that «the level of support for governors is the support enjoyed by the president.» These and other factors suggest that for the presidential election, the Kremlin plans to get about 80% of the vote for Putin by any means necessary. Such a percentage will demonstrate that «Putin enjoys the absolute support» of the majority of Russians and this will be the basis for Putin’s continued power, both in the eyes of Russian elites and many Western countries, despite the fact that, under conditions of total censorship, disinformation and repression, elections in Russia can be recognized as neither legitimate, nor transparent, nor competitive.

Apart from the «patriots» (Girkin), communists, and other Kremlin-controlled candidates, several anti-war politicians have volunteered to participate in the upcoming presidential elections: a relatively unknown journalist from regional media and activist Ekaterina Duntsova, a mother of three, who has so far had little federal-level exposure, and politician Boris Nadezhdin, widely recognized for his regular appearances on propagandist TV shows, where he plays the role of a «liberal» criticized by all other guests and hosts. Only Duntsova could be considered a genuinely independent and non-systemic potential candidate.

Nadezhdin is nominated by the «Civil Initiative» party, much like Ksenia Sobchak in 2018. Back then, many criticized Sobchak for being an artificial candidate pushed forward by the president’s administration to divert attention from preventing genuine opposition from participating in the elections.

Duntsova’s nomination is backed by an opposition project called «Our Headquarters» (in exile), launched to conduct electoral and signature campaigns abroad and within Russia, led by the «Ark» project team (most of the project’s management have been involved in various Russian elections). Several other activist groups have also started supporting Duntsova. Within one day, the very first fundraising campaign in Russia for Duntsova’s candidacy gathered over $35,000. Videos featuring Duntsova are gaining millions of views on the TikTok network. However, despite this, the campaign of the anti-war candidate is primarily seen as an agitation tool to mobilize voters, as the likelihood of her passing all stages and being allowed to participate in the vote is practically non-existent.

At the same time, the Anti-Corruption Foundation of Alexei Navalny launched its ‘Against Putin’ agitation campaign. On December 7th, the foundation’s team launched the project’s website and Telegram bot. The campaign’s goal is to encourage as many Russians as possible to vote ‘against Putin’ through various means.

It is important to emphasize that in the situation of war, dictatorship, censorship, exclusion from elections and arrests of opposition politicians and observers, destruction of independent media, mass falsifications, both in paper voting and in the active use of electronic voting, it is impossible to consider elections in Russia legitimate and fair. Therefore it is likely that the campaign demanding that the international community does not recognize the results of the presidential election in Russia will become a unifying factor for various Russian opposition groups in exile either before or immediately after the election. There are many difficulties in implementing the demand not to recognize the election results — from legal complexities and the need for Western governments to communicate with someone on the Russian side on various issues, to specific negotiations on the status of the war in Ukraine. Nevertheless, recognizing this illegitimate election will only strengthen Putin’s regime, increase its influence, and help make most Russians complicit in the Kremlin’s crimes, so the choice here is between a bad scenario and a very bad one.

Given the importance of the election period in terms of engaging the general audience in the political agenda, FRF Strategic Communications Centre, together with dozens of partner Russian projects in exile, is already running large-scale counter propaganda campaigns aimed primarily at a hesitating Russian audience. The narratives and tools of the campaigns are built around the main arguments the target audience cites as reasons not to support the war in Ukraine («too many people are dying»). Also the campaigns of FRF Stratcom are aimed at debunking the image of Putin as an «effective» leader, «father of the nation » or «great leader of great Russia». The campaigns already reach about 10-12 million people per month through various tools (about 1.2 million direct pro-government audience).

1.   Sociology on the Eve of the Russian Presidential Elections

*The authors of this report consider sociology in Russia to be biased and rely on data that is consistent across polls and confirmed by the follow-up political decisions of the Russian authorities.

1.1. Putin’s rating and prognosis

According to Russian state agency VTsIOM, the approval rate for the performance of the Russian President reached 79.2% in early November 2023. The performance of the Russian Prime Minister and Government is rated slightly lower: 62,5%. Levada Center research also shows that Putin’s approval rating remains at a high point and held at around 80 percent from May to October 2023.

Data from a closed federal poll conducted by the partner organization for the period April-June 2023 also show that about 80 percent of respondents trust or rather trust Vladimir Putin as a political leader.

One can conclude that the Kremlin not only deliberately set the bar extremely high in the September gubernatorial elections, which averaged about 78.2 percent, but also plans to make every effort to ensure that Putin himself «gets» 80 percent or more of the vote in the presidential election, since the «national leader» cannot get fewer votes than his subordinates. Putin’s spokesman Peskov said bluntly in September that «the level of support for regional heads is Putin’s support.» The same amount, about 78 percent of the vote, was given to constitutional changes in 2020.

It is important to note that according to the latest surveys conducted by the Anti-Corruption Foundation using the list experiment technique (questionnaire design technique used to mitigate respondent social desirability bias when eliciting information about sensitive topics) Putin’s actual rating at the moment is approximately 48%. However, as with polls from Levada Center, Russian Field or other agencies, confirming these results in Russia is practically impossible. We consider the most objective surveys to be those whose outcomes align across different agencies’ studies and are confirmed by the actual political situation on the ground.

1.2. Support for the war on the eve of elections

1.2.1. In October 2023, the level of attention to the war in Ukraine has not changed. 20% of respondents say they follow the SMO «very closely» (18% in September), while another 29% follow it «quite closely» (30% in September). 35% of respondents follow without much attention, and 15% do not follow the war at all. People aged 55 and older follow the events in Ukraine most closely (28% — very closely, 33% rather closely).

It is this category of citizens that is most susceptible to propaganda and disinformation, as they more often receive information from traditional media outlets, fully controlled by the Kremlin. They traditionally believe that «the state always does everything right,» while alternative sources of information lie.

The idea that peace talks should be started is most often demonstrated by representatives of the youngest age group (18-24 years old) — 69%. Those surveyed at the age of 55 and older are the only age group where opinions about the continuation of hostilities and the transition to peace talks are almost equal — 45% and 46%, respectively.

1.2.2. Data from a confidential federal-level survey conducted by a partner organization between April and June 2023 shows that 66% of respondents approve of military action in Ukraine, while 26% are opposed. Among those who favor military action:

• 31% believe it is a fight to protect Russians in Ukraine and against fascism
• 7% believe that Ukraine planned aggression and Russia prevented it.

The rest of the respondents offered over 20 less common opinions that were not grouped.

49% of respondents who do not support military action cited the fact that «too many people are dying» as the reason for their anti-war stance.

1.2.3. According to a recent survey from the Chronicles project, the number of active supporters and opponents of the war is about the same: 22% (for) and 20.1% (against) among all respondents. To better define the core of support for the war, the researchers asked three key questions:

On attitudes toward the “SMO”, the terms of troop withdrawal, and budget spending priorities. Those who gave «pro-war» answers to all questions were categorized as supporters of the war. Opponents of the war were defined as those who opposed the «SMO», would support the withdrawal of troops without the fulfillment of military tasks, and believe that budget funds should be allocated to social needs rather than to the military. Almost 58% of respondents do not associate themselves with either ardent supporters or opponents of the “SMO”, according to the survey by the Chronicles project.

1.2.4. An analysis of all polls over the past year has shown that women are more often in favor of de-escalation of the conflict, while the share of those supporting the continuation of the «military operation» increases from younger to older age groups.

Naturally, those who trust information from television (46%) and Telegram channels (41%) are more likely than others to support the continuation of military operations, while those who trust information from social networks (65%) and YouTube channels (69%) are more likely to say that it is necessary to move to peace negotiations.

In the run-up to the elections, the question «what position should political parties take towards the SMO» was added to the October 21-29 survey by the independent agency Russian Field. More than half of the Russians surveyed (58%) believe that political parties should support the SMO, while 13% of respondents believe that parties should oppose the «military operation».

An analysis of all polls shows that despite the large support for Putin, the core support for the war varies around 20%, when the majority of Russians do not categorize themselves in any group («apolitical,» «hesitant,» and «afraid»). About half of the supporters of the continuation of the war are elderly people who watch Kremlin-controlled television and depend on the authorities for medicine, pensions, and benefits. Speaking of opponents of the war, it is important to note that «not supporting the war» does not mean «not supporting the president» at all, but in most cases it means «not supporting the loss of life.»

A large number of respondents do not directly link support for Putin with support for the deaths of people, which will allow opponents of the war either to vote for Putin or not to participate in the elections at all.

In general, given that the Kremlin has created hundreds of propaganda Telegram channels, pages on TikTok, Instagram, Twitter and all other platforms to influence Russians, one must take into account that the opinions of millions of people have already been distorted to an extreme degree by the Kremlin propagandist machine, which quite effectively replaces the entire information field, making it hard for the alternative sources of information to reach its potential audience.

1.3. Sociology of Fear

1.3.1. In August 2023, the quarterly report «National Anxiety Index. CROS» prepared by the communications company under the same name* (the CROS agency was created by communications experts initially working for Yeltsin administration). According to the rating, in April- June 2023 sabotage remained the major cause of concern among Russians. This factor topped the CROS rating for the second quarter in a row.

1.3.2. Data from a survey conducted by Russian Field from September 2-10 identifies potential vulnerabilities that could affect Putin’s ratings during the election and contribute to an increase in protest voting. Among the events that could affect Putin’s support are: defeat in the military campaign, the dollar’s rise to 150 rubles, a second wave of mobilization and a ban on Russians traveling abroad. Based on this data and a general understanding of these trigger points for the electorate, it can be assumed that the Kremlin will avoid these factors in every way possible, at least until the election.

Many of the Kremlin’s decisions in the summer and early fall of 2023 clearly show that the Russian authorities closely follow sociology, are aware of the key concerns of citizens, consider sociological data relevant, and do not want to amplify people’s fears during the election period. In this case, the Russians’ anxiety index led to extremely restrained coverage of military actions, a decrease in their mentioning and a propaganda focus on the «success» of the authorities and Putin in solving various problems of the country’s development (economy, social issues, new and old powerful friends in foreign policy).

Nevertheless, since it is impossible to avoid the topic of war, we can see that the Kremlin has put it back on the agenda in a favorable way: «everything for the victory», «Putin is victory». We can conclude that the Kremlin has decided to use the lack of advancement of the Ukrainian army and the reduced focus on Ukraine in its favor. The topic of war and Russia’s «success» or «victory» may take a very important place both in the Kremlin’s election campaign and in the post-election agenda.

2.   Protest potential

Inside Russia

2.1. Despite the consolidation of society around the flag and the continued decline in support for the opposition, about 20-25% of Russians criticize Russia’s war in Ukraine. These are mostly residents of large cities and the younger generation. The Kremlin and its active supporters continue to exert significant pressure on the opposing citizens of all political views — from pro-democracy forces, to anarchists, communists, «patriots» and even the wives of mobilized soldiers. This demonstrates the authorities’ fear of any possible unrest.

The lack of response even from supporters of the war and/or the authorities to the repression of Russians of different political views, highlights the unwillingness of disgruntled citizens to stand up for their rights and the rights of their leaders in the face of personal risks. This was particularly evident in the case of Strelkov’s arrest, Prigozhin’s death, and the pressure on the wives of servicemen.

2.2. The movement of «wives of the mobilized» could potentially become a serious source of instability for the Kremlin. We are talking about wives, mothers and relatives of mobilized Russians, whom the Russian authorities have previously promised to return home and rotate, but in reality the soldiers sent to the front as early as September 2022 have not yet returned home. The wives of the mobilized are now organizing groups and movements, creating telegram channels, and attempting to hold rallies.

Their activity has already forced Kremlin propaganda to react and discredit the wives’ movement with non-existent links to the Alexei Navalny or Ukraine. It is likely that the movement of mobilized wives will grow and accumulate protest potential, which is currently at a rather low level.

2.3. According to Levada Center’s summer 2023 polls, the greatest willingness to participate in protests with economic and political demands is among low-income citizens and those who are critical of the president’s actions or believe that the country is going in the wrong direction. The percentage of Russians expecting economic protests remained virtually unchanged in the summer: 18% in March and 17% in June. 15% of respondents expressed their willingness to participate in such actions in June, compared to 16% in March.

2.4. The current international situation, which most respondents see as a confrontation between Russia (and China) and the West, also contributes to uniting a large part of the Russian population around the authorities and reducing protest activity. The majority’s perception of the situation through the lens of «us versus them» makes people less open to criticizing the authorities or the armed forces. The narrative «once we have started, we cannot lose» is also a serious incentive to support the authorities, the army and the war itself.

2.5. Although the government’s ratings are high, the existing social contradictions have not disappeared, but are only temporarily hidden. Some of them, such as demands to return mobilized soldiers home or dissatisfaction with migration and Chechnya policies, are already manifested in the public space in the form of soft protest activity.

2.6. In the context of repression and total censorship, support for the country’s leadership is still not absolute and fluctuates depending on various factors. Moreover, only a small part of those who support Putin also support the war.

It is the audience of hesitant citizens, those who generally share the Kremlin’s position or are supporting the government but opposing the war, that is most important in campaigns to expand the anti-war audience by March 2024 and beyond.

Outside of Russia

2.7. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, more than a million citizens left the country. These are all potential voters that could influence the population inside the country, and have the opportunity to vote in diplomatic missions abroad. Of course, the number of Russian votes outside the country is not decisive, even including previous waves of emigration, but the activity of Russians who oppose the war and Putin’s regime and live in safe countries during the pre-election period is important. On the one hand, Russians abroad can serve as a voice for Russians who remain in Russia and demonstrate that millions of citizens do not support Putin or the war loud and clear.

Russians outside Russia can and will be free to collect signatures for anti-war candidates, conduct counter- propaganda campaigns, do journalism on Russia during the election period, and do their best to communicate the facts about the situation in Russia to both Russians and Western partners.

Among the already planned campaigns abroad is the campaign of the Nash Shtab (Our Headquarters) project, which supports the nomination of Ekaterina Duntsova and is planning an extensive campaign to collect signatures for anti-war candidates in various countries. In parallel, other opposition forces outside Russia are preparing protest actions against illegitimate elections in various capitals.

Counterpropaganda projects are also already conducting active regional and federal campaigns from abroad in order to take advantage of the opportunity to convey to fellow citizens the truth about the war and its consequences for Russia at a time of the greatest mobilization of society during the pre-election period.

Simultaneously it is important to remember that the Russian electoral system is also preparing to make it as difficult as possible for citizens living abroad to express their will. It is known that voting at foreign polling stations has been more protest-oriented in the past, and after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and mass emigration, a significant part of the protest electorate ended up outside Russia. Even before the September regional elections, Ella Pamfilova, chair of the Central Election Commission, said that voters abroad would not be able to participate in remote electronic voting (REV), as Western countries «made this format impossible» due to a number of sanctions imposed on Russia, as well as to protect REV inside the country (electronic voting using VPN through a Russian server might work).

CEC deputy chairman Nikolai Bulayev announced a «noticeable» reduction in foreign polling stations, stating there will be «powerful, organized» resistance to the attempts at influencing the voting process in the countries that are deemed as “unfriendly”. At the same time, he said, the Russian side has the resources to organize a full-fledged vote, and the reason for the current situation is that Western politicians are trying to «create problems of an insurmountable nature and cause discontent among Russian citizens abroad, who have no opportunity to express their position in the presidential election, which is so important for the entire country».

3.   Legitimacy

It is of course evident the Kremlin will not be interested in the real legitimacy of the elections. The main task is the acquisition of legitimacy through mobilization of the electorate, imitation of popular support and compliance with bureaucratic processes created by the Kremlin itself. It is not the authorities that adjust to the legislation, but the legislation that adjusts to the authorities. This will apply to the elections themselves, to the prevention of opposition to take part in these elections, to repression, to falsifications, and to other aspects. The state apparatus will build a rigid vertical of the election process with minimal opportunities for the regions to adjust this process.

In their recent report the voters’ rights movement «Golos» stated that the results of the municipal elections on September 10, 2023 «turned out to be even less free and fair» than the elections of previous years.

The “Golos” report highlights the following points:

Characteristic features of the past election campaign

• Manipulation of legislation on the eve of elections
• Systematic attempts to impede election observation
• Lack of conditions for free public political discussion
• Increased state pressure, including force, on candidates, observers and voters
• Fusion of the state and party apparatus of the ruling party
• Loss of independence of the system of election commissions and interference of the federal center in regional and local campaigns

The election campaign of September 2023 is also characterized by forceful suppression of dissent, establishment of the only correct ideology, demonstrative manifestation of administrative resources and violations of the law. Separately, as noted by the «Golos» movement, there was a significant loss of autonomy for election commissions as well as increased vertical coercion within the electoral system.

There is no reason to expect any improvement in the March 2024 presidential election. As it is, there are practically no people left in Russia who are willing to observe the elections due to security risks. The arrest of Grigory Melkonyants, co-chairman of the Golos movement in August 2023 only reinforced such fears.

The November 2023 testing of remote electronic voting (REV) was particularly important. The Central Election Commission scheduled this testing for mid-November in all regions of the Russian Federation. More than 3.8 million voters registered for the testing according to official data. During the registration period, reports from various regions stated that heads, primarily of educational institutions, were forcing employees and parents of students to register for the REV test. One of the most high-profile stories took place in St. Petersburg, where a teacher recorded a conversation with the principal who forced her

to register, after which she was forced to resign from her position. This resonated with propagandists, who tried to «blunt» the scandal by calling the story a provocation and describing it as an interpersonal conflict (https://t.me/vcentrespb/14198, https://t.me/master_pera/12420, https://t.me/nkamnev/16312, https://t.me/alexandr_malkevich/17522).

4.   Candidates. «Non-systemic» opposition on the eve of the elections.

In all presidential elections over the past 23 years, candidates representing the «liberal» wing (Yavlinsky,

Titov, Khakamada, Prokhorov, Sobchak) have necessarily participated. In the media, in the context

of the upcoming presidential elections, Grigory Yavlinsky and Boris Nadezhdin are the most frequently mentioned candidates from the «liberal wing». Ekaterina Duntsova, an activist from Tver, is also actively appearing in the independent media.

4.1. Boris Nadezhdin announced his desire to run in the presidential election earlier than others, so he received significant media coverage. Nadezhdin is nominated from the Civil Initiative party.

The same party nominated Ksenia Sobchak five years ago, who was criticized for alleged collaborations with the Kremlin and smearing the opposition agenda. Boris Nadezhdin has been in politics for a long time. He was a State Duma deputy in 1999-2003 from the liberal SPS party. Since then, he has regularly participated in political talk shows, including the propagandist ones, where he expressed the position criticized by the hosts and other guests. Over the years, he has been nominated many times in elections at different levels from various parties, but only one nomination was successful: in 2019, he became a deputy of the Moscow Region town of Dolgoprudny, having been elected from Just Russia party and heading a faction in the council of deputies.

1.2.1. In October 2023, the level of attention to the war in Ukraine has not changed. 20% of respondents say they follow the SMO «very closely» (18% in September), while another 29% follow it «quite closely» (30% in September). 35% of respondents follow without much attention, and 15% do not follow the war at all. People aged 55 and older follow the events in Ukraine most closely (28% — very closely, 33% rather closely)., an activist from the Tver region and a mother of three children, also announced her candidacy. Since she plans to run independently of the parties, she will need to collect 300,000 signatures to register as a candidate. The team of the «Our Headquarters» project, which is helping Duntsova’s campaign, has launched a website and created a telegram channel for the activist, which already has tens of thousands of subscribers (posts get hundreds of thousands of views). The channel is actively supported (and promoted as volunteer work) by the major opposition telegram channel Ateo Breaking.

Other major bloggers and media outlets frequently make reposts from Duntsova’s channel: SOTA, Ekaterina Shulman, Ark (Ark’s team founded the project «Our Headquarters» to help anti-war candidates in the elections). The Russian propaganda media do not mention Duntsova. Only the Life edition once mentioned Duntsova in its material, but in a different context. Perhaps propaganda does not yet know how to react to the candidate. Since Duntsova announced her desire to participate, she has received a lot of support from young people inside Russia, which is evident from the hundreds of posts with millions of views on the TikTok social network. Supporting Duntsova on social media has become fashionable.

In her nomination announcement, Duntsova wrote that she wanted Russia to be «a democratic, prosperous and peaceful state,» but now the country is moving «in a completely different direction: away from rights and freedoms, away from love and peace, away from a beautiful future.» She wrote nothing about Putin or the war in her first post or in subsequent posts. Naturally, mentioning war is likely to land a mother of three in jail, so, as with the Yabloko party in the regional elections in September, Duntsova will stick to the «peace» agenda, avoiding the word «war.»

Ekaterina Duntsova was a deputy (nominated as a self-nominated candidate, managed to beat candidates from United Russia and the CPRF) of the city of Rzhev in 2019-2022. She called to participate in the vote against amendments to the Constitution. Duntsova is so far the youngest possible candidate and the only woman to have announced her desire to become president. This could be viewed very favorably by voters. According to a Russian Field poll conducted in September 2023, such characteristics are attractive to voters.

4.3. However, the main question in terms of opposition candidates is whether the Kremlin will allow at least one of them to be registered. The campaigns of the opposition forces as a whole also depend on this, as the electoral period is extremely important in terms of engaging the population in the political agenda.

Possible campaign options for different exiled opposition groups now include supporting an anti-war candidate, signature collection campaigns for anti-war candidates in different countries, organizing mass actions outside Russia, and a campaign «for any candidate against Putin”. Many groups agree on the need for a broad campaign demanding that the results of the presidential election not be recognized by the West.

5.   Putin’s political image and the main narratives of the 2024 campaign

The start of Putin’s election campaign is recorded as early as February 2023. The Kremlin launched Putin’s campaign with a trip to the occupied territories. This summer the campaign overshadowed the war agenda, and its rigid schedule was not influenced even by Yevgeny Prigozhin’s «mutiny.» In the current campaign the presidential administration is using strategies similar to 2018.

5.1. Internal Context

• Putin as a leader of people of all nationalities of Russia / multinational Russia
• (Grand)father of the nation: image of a caring father, meeting with children
• Effective manager: Putin meets regularly with regional heads, demonstrating his competence
• Public support: Kremlin activists have already begun to show support in most regions

5.2. Main images

Liberator and anti-colonialist, builder of a «new just world»
Prior to the International Criminal Court’s decision on Putin’s warrant, media and analysts claimed that the president would emphasize anti-Western and decolonial rhetoric in his election campaign. These narratives have been popular since the Soviet era. Since Putin cannot personally visit African and Latin American countries, Sergei Lavrov fulfills this role. Nevertheless, it is Putin who is the frontman of this campaign, the narratives of which have been traced back to the grain deal and Russia’s relations with Africa, North Korea, Iran, India, China, and the Kremlin’s propaganda on the Hamas attack on Israel.

Masculinity
Putin continues to maintain his image as a strong and confident man. Although he no longer parades himself shirtless while riding a horse, his tie-less, sunglasses-wearing style remains relevant. Despite aging, this look continues to be utilized. A widely supported politician, well-liked by both domestic and international elite ( a «friend» of Xi and defender of the oppressed in Africa, North Korea and other disadvantaged countries and lands across the globe)

5.3. The Presidenteal Executive Office of Russia obtained the rights to use the trademarks «Putin Team» and «Putin Team. People’s Front». Initially, «Agency» covered the fact that applications for registration of these trademarks were filed in early October, and in mid-November these marks were already registered. «Putin Team» or «Putin’s Team» is a reference to a similar campaign in support of Putin, which was implemented before the 2018 elections. Back then the Putin Team movement was announced by hockey player Alexander Ovechkin on November 2, 2017. «Vedomosti» wrote that the idea originated in the «IMA-consulting» company, and afterwards was supported in the Kremlin.

Political scientist Yevgeny Minchenko said at the time that the new movement was «primarily useful to the Kremlin to help shake the Western stereotype that the best people in Russia do not support Putin, but are supporters of the opposition.» With the departure of many pop and sports stars from Russia, it is no longer the West but the Russians themselves that have to be convinced that the «best people» in fact support Putin.

As of now, the creation or revival of the Putin Team movement is not publicly announced. But the brand is being actively promoted. In particular, the All-Russian People’s Front, which now more often calls itself the «People’s Front», promotes the movement through its channels. The brand of Putin’s Team is also promoted in major propagandist telegram channels, including those of Z bloggers and war correspondents (Solovyov, Karaulny Z, Ruslan Ostashko, Kots). Zakhar Prilepin has also joined Putin’s Team. «Putin’s Team» and the People’s Front created in 2011 play an important role in Putin’s campaign, mobilizing opinion leaders and voters around him.

The participation of «symbols of war» (Shaman, Zhoga) in Putin’s public campaign suggests that the theme of the special operation will now take an important place in it. This is confirmed by the fact that the People’s Front has launched a separate project «For Transparency. War correspondents of Russia» — a tg-channel, created in cooperation with the war correspondents. The channel was mentioned in the People’s front tg-channel, this information further reposted by Solovyov, Ostashko, and Roman Khudyakov (former LDPR State Duma deputy).

The National Front itself previously used to deal a lot with complaints against regional officials, but has now shifted its attention to the war, under the slogan «Everything for the Victory ». It actively advertises personalized fundraisers to equip war participants (fundraisers from musicians Alexander Marshal and Yulia Chicherina, a fundraiser from war correspondent Kots, etc.). The channel also publishes quotes from famous people who have joined the project «People’s Front. Putin’s Team», linking the narrative «Everything for the Victory» with the image of Putin.

6.   Vulnerabilities of Putin’s image

War

Undoubtedly, defeats and losses at the front as well as sabotage and drone attacks on Russian cities remain the major vulnerability for Vladimir Putin. Propaganda has learned to effectively offset the negative effect of such events, but studies of Russians’ fears show that these are the factors that worry citizens more than others. Putin cannot afford to break the unspoken pact of “successful protection of the society”.

Breaking such a contract would affect the president’s support. On the other hand, in the event of immediate threats to Russia’s security from Ukraine, people may get even more supportive, as they will see no one but Putin to «protect» them and win the war. When comes to the war question it is «either us or them.»

Support for the president could also be affected by the growing movement of wives of mobilized soldiers, if their husbands do not return home. If the regime decides to repress this category of citizens as well,

Putin may become a «traitor» in the eyes of his own supporters. If there is no repression and women continue to protest, they may move from the narrow topic of the mobilized soldiers to the broader topic of the harm done to Russia as a whole and Putin’s personal responsibility for the current sad state of affairs.

Age

According to theRussian Field poll, 68% of Russian citizens do not want to see a person «over 70» in the upcoming presidential election. Putin is 71. This factor will probably not go unnoticed by the presidential administration and the image campaign will try to distract the population’s attention from Putin’s age. They will of course utilize the idea of the lack of more acceptable candidates and the emphasis on older presidents of other countries.

7. FRF Strategic Communications Centre’s Public Campaigns for the 2024 Elections

7.1. More than 50% of the Russian population are not active opponents or supporters of the war, and the authorities can convert a large part of them into their support. Applying the strategy of «strengthening opponents of the war» (20-25% of the population) can transform some of the hesitant citizens from more «neutral» to anti-war. A particularly sensitive audience is citizens under 35 years of age.

Since an absolute majority of Russians across the polls cite «loss of life» as a reason for «rather not supporting the SMO,» the campaign narrative for «strengthening the opponents» should be precisely focusing on the fact that «too many people have died.» To reach this audience, social media must be used to massively disseminate daily updated information on the number of Russians and Ukrainians killed in the war.

7.2. Other campaign narratives ahead of the 2024 presidential election Economy (examples, facts)

• inflation growth, price increases, ruble depreciation
• pensions and benefits
• increase in poverty, decrease in wages, loss of jobs

Putin has brought war to Russia and made our country unsafe (facts, examples)

• Drone attacks
• Terrorist attacks are possible in any city
• We or our children or husbands could be taken to war and never return
• The country’s borders could be closed at any moment
• Mass migration, jobs are being filled by migrants

Foreign policy narrative to a domestic audience (examples, facts)

• Putin has no authority in the world
• No one fears or respects Putin
• Putin will be arrested for war crimes
• Putin is unable to solve conflicts, he only make them worse
• The war makes no sense and will be lost, it must be stopped immediately
• Russia cannot be great with such a president

• A great Russia needs a great leader
• Russia needs a leader who cares about Russia’s development, not personal wealth and power
• Putin was once a well-respected leader but now he is only recognized and respected by other terrorists and dictators

7.3. Tools for the FRF Stratcom campaigns

• Daily updates for the citizens on the real number of war casualties spread on social media, like VKontakte and Odnoklassniki. This is particularly important during the election campaign.
• Targeted mass mailings of messages in Telegram to users of the following categories:
  • Women up to 45-50 years old, men up to 35 years old
  • Residents of large cities (from 500 thousand people)
  • Residents of regions with the highest number of losses in the war with Ukraine
  • Residents of cities and regions bordering Ukraine
  • Parents of high school students, students
• Campaigns in regional Telegram channels with an oppositional and neutral agenda

7.4. Campaign to reduce supporters of the war and weaken general support for Putin

A campaign to debunk the image of Putin as a «(grand)father of the nation», «president of all Russians», «effective leader» and «protector» with an emphasis on the «patriotically» minded segment of the audience.

The content of the campaign should inform citizens about the real failures of the President, as well as social and economic problems while also promoting the image of a weak and ineffective leader who betrayed Russia and Russians for the sake of preserving his own power and wealth.

Associations: weakness, inefficiency, ineffectiveness, helplessness, lack of power, betrayal

7.5. Relatives of the mobilized

A separate narrative aimed at reducing Putin’s support in the context of the war theme revival and the propagandist idea of «supporting Putin for victory» could be promoted by covering the problems of the mobilized and their relatives on social media and in Telegram channels. The campaign should not and will not overlap with the activism of the mobilized wives’ movement, so as not to discredit its natural development with direct outside support, but promoting parallel narratives and informing Russian citizens about Putin’s broken promises to bring soldiers home is a necessary factor. It is suggested that we emphasize Putin’s direct personal culpability for the loss of life or the suffering of soldiers and their families. This clearly demonstrates that the president’s actions are betraying the interests of Russia and the Russian people, and that Putin is not the protector but a traitor.

Another important narrative is the «injustice» of Putin, who keeps talking about a «new just world». While those mobilized in September 2022 are not released to their families, war prisoners return home and receive pardons. A huge number of them immediately re-offend, hurting regular Russian citizens. Is this Putin’s «just world»?